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Abstract—Acquiring data from cloud storage services has
become increasingly important to digital forensic investiga-
tions. As more providers offer greater online storage facilities
and user data is synchronised across multiple devices, an
abundance of data sources has become available to assist with
forensic investigations. However, such data can only become
evidence when there is a thorough understanding of the data
dynamics between client devices and the cloud, and there
are explanations for any variations. This paper documents
and analyses the artefacts created by interactions between
Apple’s cloud service, email and contacts applications. An
explanation of as to why some artefacts synchronised over
the cloud do not have matching cryptographic hashes is
offered, and the ability to establish email origin on a system
of multiple devices sharing a single account is established.
Keywords-Digital Forensics; Apple; cloud computing; iOS;
smart phones;
I. INTRODUCTION
As more companies offer greater online data storage
facilities at little or no cost, acquiring data from cloud
storage services has become increasingly important to
digital forensic investigations. However, acquiring data
from cloud services presents problems to investigators
in comparison to traditional computer forensics [1]. The
virtualisation of data and its distribution across multi-
ple servers in multiple locations means that obtaining a
physical hard drive for imaging is very unlikely, if not
impossible.
This has led to researchers developing innovative meth-
ods to acquire data from cloud storage services [2], [3],
[4]. Data is increasingly shared across a user’s multiple
devices through the cloud and this can be leveraged by in-
vestigators to obtain data from cloud storage services. For
example, in 2014 when Apple launched OSX 10.10 for its
computers and laptops, and iOS 8 for its mobile phones
and tablets, great emphasis was placed on the Continuity
feature that provided increased automatic synchronisation
of data between its cloud storage service, iCloud, and
users’ mobile phones, tablets and computers [5]. This
automatic replication of data across client devices, as well
as cloud storage provision, presents multiple sources of
potentially valuable evidence for forensic investigators.
However, such data can only become reliable evidence
when there is a complete understanding of how the data
is created, replicated, and distributed across client devices
and online storage.
Currently there is still a lack of understanding of the
relationship between data stored in the cloud and that
retained on devices following an interaction [6]. These
interactions between the cloud and client devices leave
behind a potentially rich source of information, however
evidentiary material may be misunderstood or even missed
if the dynamics of cloud data is not established [7].
As data migrates from device to device with very little,
if any, user interaction, it is important to be able to
establish not only that the data exists, but also how it came
to be on the device [8]. Furthermore, as investigators often
need to link a suspect to a specific device at a specific
time [9], it follows that there should be no doubt the
device in question is indeed where the evidence originated
from. To date there has been little research conducted
into establishing from which device data originated, before
being synchronised through the cloud and onto a users
other devices.
Although there is a growing body of research into
acquiring data from cloud storage services, there are
still unanswered questions as to why certain recovered
artefact hash values do not match the original. Changes to
evidence should be avoided and any alterations must be
explained [8]. Forensic investigators establish the integrity
of evidence by comparing the cryptographic hash value
of recovered artefacts with the original data. When a
document is run through a hash function it produces a
hash value. The slightest alteration to the document would
produce a completely different hash value. Recent research
in cloud forensics has produced mixed results regarding
the integrity of recovered artefacts [3], [10].
To address these issues, the aim of this paper is to
conduct research into the transfer of Apple’s email and
contacts data between a client’s devices and the cloud,
and by doing so answer the following questions:
1) Can the origin of email artefacts be determined
in a system of multiple devices linked to a single
account?
2) What causes a hash value mismatch for certain data
across linked devices?
A. Contributions
This research will help investigators determine if sus-
pect emails originated from the device being investigated.
This can be crucial information required to link the suspect
to the deed. An explanation is provided as to why emails
synchronised across linked devices do not have matching
hash values. This is important for explaining alterations to
evidence. A further contribution of this paper is to provide
the forensic community with an understanding of the types
and locations of email and contacts artefacts on iOS and
OSX operating systems.
This paper is structured as follows: Section Two dis-
cusses the progress of research into data acquisition from
cloud interactions. Section Three describes the experi-
mental approach undertaken to address the research ques-
tions. Section Four reports the findings and discusses the
results. Section Five draws conclusions from the research
undertaken and presents future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The problems facing cloud forensic investigators is well
documented [11], [12], [13], [14] and there is now a
growing body of research looking into one of the main
issues, identifying and acquiring evidence from the cloud
in a forensically sound manner.
A process for the recovery of artefacts that remained
after accessing cloud storage services was devised [2].
This study also documented artefacts that can be found on
computers (Windows, OSX) and smartphones (Android
and iOS) that relate to usage of cloud services: Amazon
S3, Dropbox, GoogleDocs and Evernote. A case study
was also conducted in which files from System A were
uploaded to Dropbox and subsequently located on System
B after having been synchronised with the cloud server.
Details of these artefacts were provided, as well as where
they could be found on different operating systems, logs,
databases and cache files. Although the artefacts were
not hashed to confirm there were no alterations from
the original files to synchronised versions, this study did
explore the idea of data transitioning from one device to
another via cloud storage services, which is very relevant.
Another study focused on three popular cloud storage
providers: Dropbox, Box and SugarSync [6]. Rather than
attempting to acquire the data stored on the cloud servers
directly, the researchers proposed the use of smartphones
as proxies to download the data. Using Android and iOS
smartphones, the cloud services were accessed through
the cloud storage applications that were downloaded and
installed onto the smartphones. These applications create
various artefacts that can be very useful to forensic in-
vestigations, including synchronised copies of the actual
documents as well as associated metadata. It is not certain
if the documents recovered were altered in any way from
the original files, as the researchers did not appear to
create cryptographic hashes for later comparison before
uploading the data set to the cloud storage providers.
These studies established that data could be recovered
from the cloud by linking devices to the account and
synchronising the data to the device. Further research
was required to determine if data copied from cloud
storage services was an exact copy of the original. To
put this another way: “Does the act of collection result
in changes to the data or its metadata?”[3]. To answer
this question the researchers analysed Dropbox, Google
Drive and Microsoft SkyDrive and utilised both MD5
and SHA1 cryptographic hashing to confirm whether any
changes or not were made to the content of the files
downloaded. Network traffic was captured using the packet
analyser, Wireshark, in an attempt to view any plain text
communication between client and server. It was found
that files stored in Dropbox and then downloaded via
a browser interface matched the hashes of the original
files. In fact these results were replicated for Google
Drive and Microsoft SkyDrive - data remains the same,
but timestamps alter, generally to when they have been
downloaded.
In contrast to this, a study which focused specifically
on Apple’s cloud service, iCloud, found that synchro-
nising data across devices, altered that data for certain
applications [10]. The researcher located artefacts created
by linking to the iCloud service and determined, by the
use of cryptographic hashes, whether the artefacts created
were identical to those on the original machine. As well
as variations in timestamps, there were also variations in
the MD5 hash values of files generated from preinstalled
applications, despite the textual content of the files remain-
ing unchanged. The files that appeared to alter without
explanation included emails, contacts and databases.
This section showed the growing body of work investi-
gating methods to acquire data using alternative methods.
Data is being synchronised across cloud storage services
and onto users’ multiple devices providing forensic in-
vestigators with new sources from which they can recover
evidence. However, an investigator may also need to know
from which device evidence originated and to date, there
is very little research in this area, other than a study that
aimed to determine the origin of instant messages [15].
The following sections outline how the origin of certain
artefacts, shared across linked devices and cloud storage,
can be determined. Furthermore, an explanation is offered
as to how synchronised artefacts may alter and prevent
cryptographic hash values from matching.
III. METHODOLOGY
The aim of this research is to identify, compare and
analyse email and address book artefacts on iOS 8 and
OSX 10.10 devices. To achieve this, experiments were
conducted involving the exchange of emails and contact
data on an Apple iPad Mini and an Apple MacBook Pro.
The experiments were broken into six stages. These stages
included:
1) preparing the devices and creating a user account
2) creating email and contact artefacts based on typical
user usage
3) documenting artefact metadata and hashes
4) capturing communications from each device using
Wireshark
5) locating and documenting new and amended arte-
facts created by the usage of Apple’s Mail and
Contacts applications
6) comparing the new data on each device with the
original data
Wireshark was deployed to capture the network traffic
during each experiment. The resulting .PCAP file was later
analysed to determine the communication process between
the devices and the cloud.
The iOS device used in the experiment is an iPad Mini
model A1432 with iOS 8.1.2 installed. The iPad had
been jailbroken using Pangu v1.2.1.[16]. Jailbreaking is
a method developed in order to bypass Apple’s access
restrictions. It is a process that allows users to install
and execute applications that have not been approved by
Apple. These applications were required to access the iPad
with a fully interactive shell, allowing the file system
to be accessed and the artefacts hashed and analysed.
Jailbreaking a device alters data that is stored on the device
and as such this should not be taken as a recommended
acquisition method. As the jailbreaking was done before
the experiments were conducted, it will have had no
adverse effect on the artefacts under discussion. Forensic
investigators should acquire data from iOS devices using
established acceptable tools and methods. For example,
commercial tools such as Lantern by Katana Forensics,
Forensic Extractor by Oxygen Forensics, and the Elcom-
soft Mobile Forensic Bundle can acquire data from iOS
devices depending on model types and versions. iTunes
backup files could also be used recover data.
The OSX device used in the communication exchange
was a virtual machine freshly installed with OSX 10.10.2.
The use of a virtual machine was chosen as it allowed
an efficient method of running multiple experiments by
reverting the operating system and applications back to the
original settings. This method has been used in previous
research [10]. Specifications of the hardware for each
device is detailed in Table I. These devices were chosen
based on practicality and availability.
Table I
APPARATUS
Feature iPad Mini (A1432) MacBook Pro
Operating System iOS 8.1.2 (12B440) 10.10.2
Processor A5 2.6 GHz Intel Core i5
Memory 512MB 8GB 1600 MHz DDR3
The following steps were undertaken to prepare the iPad
Mini for the experiments.
1) The iPad Mini was reset to its default factory
settings.
2) A new user was created which creates a new Apple
ID and iCloud account.
3) The operating system was updated to the latest
version.
4) The iPad was connected via WiFi to the Internet.
5) The iPad was logged onto the iCloud account and
configured to synchronise the following services:
iCloud Drive, which included Safari, Photos, Mail,
Contacts, Calendars, Reminders, Notes, Keychain
and Find My iPad. The Mail account was configured
with the new user account and Share My Location
was activated.
6) New, fictional contacts were created using the Con-
tacts application.
7) Emails were sent to and from a third-party email
account and the iOS iPad Mini.
After email and contact data were created the relevant
iOS artefacts were located immediately by connecting to
the iPad via a secure shell (SSH) connection to search
for files that had been recently modified using a Unix
command which is shown and explained in Fig. 1.
Figure 1. Breakdown of command used to find modified files.
The find command checks every file on the operating
system and notes when it was last modified. A list is
generated of those files that have been modified within the
stated time. The list of files was then manually analysed
by the researcher to separate relevant email and contact
artefacts from unconnected background processes that
were also present.
The following steps were undertaken to prepare the
MacBook Pro for the experiment:
1) VMWare Fusion Professional (Version 7.1.1) was in-
stalled to allow for the creation of virtual machines.
2) Mac OS X 10.10.2 was installed in a virtual machine
and updated.
3) A snapshot was taken of the operating system at this
time to allow the virtual machine to be reset to this
state for future experiments. A copy was made of
the virtual machine image to reflect the state of the
system before logging into the newly created user
iCloud/Apple ID account.
4) From the iCloud application in System Preferences,
the virtual machine was configured with the same
Apple ID and user account as was configured for the
iPad mini. This initiated synchronisation between
the iCloud account and the MacBook Pro.
5) New, fictional contacts were created using the Con-
tacts application.
6) Emails were sent to and from a third-party email
account and the Mac OSX.
7) Mail and Contact applications were opened and
closed to ensure documents were synchronised.
The relevant OSX artefacts were located by opening
a terminal and searching for files that had been recently
modified using the same Unix command as was used with
the iPad.
Both devices were connected to a wireless access point
that was being monitored by Wireshark. This allowed the
capture and analysis of the communications between the
client devices and the iCloud servers.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section reviews the results of the data analysis
conducted after iOS, OSX Mail and Contacts usage. A
description of Mail’s communication process is presented
first, followed by details of relevant artefact locations that
remain after using Mail. The hash values of artefacts are
then compared across OSX and iOS devices concluding
with an analysis of the results. The same format is then
used for the Contacts application.
A. Mail
1) Communication Process: Apple’s Mail application
uses the Internet Message Access Protocol over SSL
(IMAPS), allowing multiple clients to simultaneously con-
nect to the same mailboxes to retrieve emails. Devices
frequently contact the Apple servers to check for any up-
dates as well as updating the server of any local changes.
Any changes made by one device will be replicated across
all devices through the central point of the Apple mail
servers. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is used for
sending emails. Table II shows the output of the Wireshark
packet capture confirming the mail protocol used by iOS
and OSX to retrieve messages.
2) File Locations: A relevant selection of artefacts,
recently created and modified after an email exchange
on OSX, is shown in Table III. The binary property list
files mainly contain user preference settings. The log files
didn’t reveal any personal information of the user and
no information could be extracted from the data files.
Most email content and metadata is stored in the SQLite
database - Protected Index. Emails are stored in
folders relating to individual mail accounts (e.g. Gmail,
Yahoo!, Hotmail), subdivided into mailbox folders: drafts,
inbox, outbox, etc. Personal folders created by the user
also show within the mail account folder. Individual emails
(.emlx files) are located within their individual mailbox
folders.
iOS mainly relies on SQLite databases to store emails
and associated metadata. The two main databases used for
this purpose are Envelope Index and Protected
Index, shown in Table IV. Email attachments are embed-
ded within the message_data table of the Protected
Index table. The only instance observed of iOS saving
an individual email file (.emlx), was when the email had
been sent from the iOS device. The Recents database
contained email addresses, paths of iCloud mailboxes and
the map location of an Apple email.
3) Cryptographic Hash Values: Hash values were taken
of an email file (.emlx) sent from the iOS device and
the equivalent email file on the OSX device. Viewing the
content of the stored files revealed that the OSX .emlx
file had extra metadata embedded into the message that
was not in the iOS version. This is clearly why these file
hash values will not match.
4) Analysis: Users would see no discernible difference
in an email on their iOS device compared to the same
email on their OSX device. However, a forensic investi-
gator would discover different cryptographic hash values
of the underlying data from each source. This is because
SQLite databases are unlikely to be exactly the same on
different devices, especially if the devices use different
operating systems.
Even if the database structures are identical, data is not
always entered into the main database at the same time.
The mechanism for entering data into SQLite databases
initially involves a separate file, the Write Ahead Log
(.wal file), which logs entries and only commits data
to the main database file at certain checkpoints.
On occasions when there are individual email files that
can be compared, for example, when the iOS device keeps
an .emlx copy of an email sent locally, OSX embeds
metadata within its copy of the file which will result in
mismatched hashes.
While failing to match hashes may be problematic for
forensic investigators, the subtle differences that can be
found across devices and operating systems may prove
to be valuable in discerning from which device artefacts
originated. These experiments revealed that the iOS device
will only keep .emlx copies of emails that originated lo-
cally. Furthermore, part of the metadata embedded within
the OSX .emlx email file, shown in Listing 1, only
appears when the email did not originate from the local
device. This knowledge can useful to an investigation in




Listing 1. Metadata contained within the .emlx file
B. Contacts
1) Communication process: Based on the analysis of
artefacts found on each device and packet data captured
using Wireshark, it appears that after a Contacts file
has been altered on the local device a communication
is initiated with iCloud servers. A vCard is created and
stored online as a .vcf file which is an Internet standard
for the sharing of contact information. The standardisation
of this format enables the transition of data from differing
applications and operating systems. A user’s other iCloud
linked devices will then contact the relevant iCloud server
to extract the information required and adapt it to the file
structure of that device, updating the local database to
include the new details. This communication process was
captured using Wireshark and the data is shown in Table
V.
2) File Locations: The results of querying the
OSX file system after Contacts usage determined the
locations of the artefacts relating to the Contacts
application. OSX devices store most Contacts
data in: /Users/<username>/Library/
ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/ as shown
in Table VI. Local contacts are located in the SQLite
database AddressBook-v22.abcddb, whereas
online contacts (iCloud, MSExchange, etc.) are located in
databases of the same name, but separated into individual
Table II
WIRESHARK CAPTURE OF Mail ICLOUD COMMUNICATION USING IMAP OVER SSL
No. Source Destination Protocol Length Info
1 192.168.100.55 192.168.100.1 DNS 91 Standard query 0xa433 A p33-imap.mail.me.com.akadns.net
2 192.168.100.1 192.168.100.55 DNS 107 Standard query response 0xa433 A 17.142.165.10
3 192.168.100.55 17.142.165.10 TCP 78 53829 >imaps [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=16TSval=987360204 TSecr=0 SACK PERM=1
4 17.142.165.10 192.168.100.55 TCP 74 imaps >53829 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=14480 Len=0 MSS=1380SACK PERM=1 TSval=679404437 TSecr=987360204 WS=128
5 192.168.100.55 17.142.165.10 TCP 66 53829 >imaps [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=131328 Len=0 TSval=987360392TSecr=679404437
6 192.168.100.55 17.142.165.10 TLSv1 237 Client Hello
Table III
OS X Mail ARTEFACT LOCATION AND TYPE










mbox/Info.plist Binary property list
/Users/<username>/Library/Mail/V2/MailData/EnvelopeIndex-wal SQLite database log
Table IV
IOS Mail ARTEFACT LOCATION AND TYPE
File Location File Type
/private/var/mobile/Library/
Mail/EnvelopeIndex-wal SQLite database log
/private/var/mobile/Library/








Mail/metadata.plist Binary property list
folders within the Sources folder. A record of every
new contact, change and deletion is recorded in another
database ABAssistantChangelog.aclcddb.
OSX devices also store individual card files for each
contact and group in the Metadata folder in the form
of a binary property list. Profile pictures are stored in the
Images folder. Files with -shm and -wal extensions are
components of the SQLite database of the same name.
For iOS devices, artefacts created or modified
after recent Contacts usage were located in
/private/var/mobile/Library/, the details
of which are shown in Table VII. Contacts profile images
are stored in /private/var/mobile/Library/
AddressBookImages.sqlitedb.
As well as the standard contact details that would
be expected within an address book application, there
are other revealing details within the AddressBook.
sqlitedb (iOS) and AddressBook-v22.abcddb
(OSX) databases. Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) can
be extracted from the database specifying the location of
both profile images and .vcf files stored in the iCloud ac-
count. Using the command line tool cURL, it is possible to
directly connect to the iCloud server, located at https:
//p33-contacts.icloud.com:443, and download
these files to any computer with no requirement for an
OSX or iOS device.




Listing 2. cURL command used to download contact card
The URL location is documented in the
ABPerson table within the iOS SQLite
database AddressBook.sqlitedb and in the
ZABCDCUSTOMPROPERTYVALUE table within the OSX
AddressBook-v22.abcddb database.
3) Cryptographic Hash Values: As shown in the pre-
vious sections, iOS and OSX devices store data from
the Contacts applications in different ways. iOS de-
vices store the majority of data in the SQLite database
AddressBook.sqlitedb, with profile pictures stored
in AddressBookImages.sqlitedb. Whereas OSX
devices have a database (AddressBook-v22.abcddb)
for some data, another database for indexing any changes
(ABAssistantChangelog.aclcddb), as well as
separate folders for profile pictures and individual contact
files. There appears to be no comparative artefact that can
be used for hashing comparison.
4) Analysis: From a user’s perspective, a contact on
an iOS iPad and the same contact on an OSX Mac-
BookPro will look the same and contain the same details.
However, the way in which each operating system stores
this information differs. While both systems make use of
Table V
WIRESHARK CAPTURE OF Contacts ICLOUD COMMUNICATION
No. Source Destination Protocol Length Info
1 192.168.100.55 192.168.100.1 DNS 94 Standard query 0xf316 A p33-contacts.icloud.com.akadns.net
2 192.168.100.1 192.168.100.55 DNS 110 Standard query response 0xf316 A 17.142.164.22
3 192.168.100.55 17.142.164.22 TCP 78 53761 >https [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=16TSval=968316153 TSecr=0 SACK PERM=1
4 17.142.164.22 192.168.100.55 TCP 58 https >53761 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8190 Len=0 MSS=1360
5 192.168.100.55 17.142.164.22 TCP 54 53761 >https [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0
6 192.168.100.55 17.142.164.22 TLSv1.2 280 Client Hello
Table VI
OS X Contacts ARTEFACT LOCATION AND TYPE
File Location File Type
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/ABAssistantChangelog.
aclcddb-shm SQLite shared memory
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/ABAssistantChangelog.
aclcddb-wal SQLite database log
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/Metadata/.info Binary property list
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/Sources/<UUID>
/AddressBook-v22.abcddb-wal SQLite database log
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/Sources/<UUID>
/Metadata/.info Binary property list
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/Sources/<UUID>
/Metadata/1F386650-3419-4083-B07F-8DC3376A888E:ABGroup.abcdg Binary property list
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/Sources/<UUID>
/Metadata/9CD94F50-D1DA-44D1-8F89-7D782897346F:ABPerson.abcdp Binary property list
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/Sources/<UUID>/Images/
6B4B1DDD-F94A-4897-A06A-EB3933C5B513 JPEG image data
/Users/<username>/Library/ApplicationSupport/AddressBook/Sources/<UUID>
/Metadata/CED7FC41-CA62-4571-A494-00DA0AD63492:ABInfo.abcdi Binary property list
/Users/<username>/Library/Caches/com.apple.AddressBookSourceSync/Cache.db-shm SQLite shared memory
Table VII
IOS Contacts ARTEFACT LOCATION AND TYPE
File Location File Type
/private/var/mobile/Library/





SQLite databases, OSX also keeps individual contact files
and profile images in separate folders. For iOS devices,
everything is embedded within databases. Further, the iOS
and OSX databases differ in the number of tables, naming
conventions and table structures. Yet both systems are
able to display and share the same content. This is made
possible by using a standardised format for storing the
data in the iCloud. There were no vCards found on either
the OSX or iOS system, but this appears to be how
the information is stored centrally and accessed by each
device.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
User data is increasingly shared across a user’s multiple
devices and on cloud storage platforms. As data migrates
from device to device and through the cloud, it is important
for forensic investigators to be able to establish not only
where evidence can be located, but also how it came to
be there.
This paper presented an analysis of email and contacts
artefacts on iOS and OSX devices. The results presented
in the previous sections, provide answers to the research
questions posed in Section One.
1) This study has been able to show subtle differences
in artefacts that can help determine the origin of
certain email communications.
2) An explanation has been provided as to why cer-
tain data stored on different devices can not have
matching hash values.
This study has also documented the type, location and
content of artefacts that could be helpful in forensic
investigations. Understanding the origin of these artefacts
could help determine whether the evidence recovered is
incriminating or exculpatory.
This study was limited to Apple devices, Mail and Con-
tacts applications. Additional research would be required
to determine if similar results would occur in third-party
mail providers such as Hotmail and Gmail. The scope
of this research can also be widened as personal data
is shared between more devices with the introduction of
watches, fitness trackers, televisions and domestic appli-
ances.
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